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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME CULPABILITY: 
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MATTHEW B. KUGLER** 
We are accustomed to thinking of “crime” as involving the most 
blameworthy and antisocial sorts of conduct in which citizens can engage, 
conduct that is clearly and unambiguously more wrongful than conduct that is 
not criminal. But the reality is more complex, especially when we look at certain 
kinds of “white collar” behavior. One of us (Green) has previously undertaken 
an in-depth investigation of the underlying moral concepts that distinguish 
white collar crime from “merely aggressive behavior.”1 This work attempted to 
differentiate, for example, between criminal fraud and “sharp dealing,” insider 
trading and “savvy investing,” bribery and “horse trading,” tax evasion and “tax 
avoidance,” extortion and “hard bargaining,” witness tampering and “witness 
preparation,” and perjury and “wiliness on the witness stand.”2 
Such analysis often depended on fairly fine-grained distinctions in moral 
reasoning. The problem is that the ability of criminal law to stigmatize, to 
achieve legitimacy, and to gain compliance ultimately depends on the extent to 
which it enjoys moral credibility and recognition in the broader lay community.3 
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 1. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME (2006). We recognize that the concept of “white collar” crime has been highly 
contested in the academic literature, and that its use varies significantly even in common discourse. For 
present purposes, we adhere to the “moral” conception of white collar crime previously developed by 
Green, id. 9–29, according to which the term “white collar crime” refers to a loose collection of criminal 
offenses and related conduct distinguished by distinctive forms of harm and victimization, distinctive 
forms of wrongfulness, and a distinctive role for mens rea. 
 2. See id. 
 3. We have previously discussed this point in Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community 
Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A Challenge to Model Penal Code and English Theft Act 
Consolidation, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 511, 515–17 (2010). See also Stuart P. Green, Taking it 
to the Streets, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 61 (2011), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/ 
vol/89/responses/green. 
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If legally significant distinctions between fraud and non-fraud—or perjury and 
non-perjury—can be discerned only through abstract philosophical reasoning, it 
is reasonable to wonder whether the public will lend these distinctions the 
moral weight required for the law to be effective and legitimate. 
This paper seeks to determine the extent to which the lay public’s moral 
intuitions parallel the law in distinguishing between white collar crime and 
related non-crime by focusing on three domains of conduct: (1) bribery and 
gratuities; (2) perjury and false statements; and (3) fraud. These types of 
conduct are of practical significance and reflect the kind of moral ambiguity that 
is characteristic of white collar crime. This paper examines each category to 
determine where the lay public would draw the line between criminality and 
non-criminality; and, where such conduct is regarded as criminal, how it would 
be graded. The analysis aims to identify the extent to which public perceptions 
are consistent or inconsistent with current law. 
Our studies found that lay persons, in general, are comfortable making fairly 
fine-grained distinctions regarding the law of white collar crime. In some cases, 
the distinctions made by our respondents were consistent with current law; this 
should lend weight to the view that the law in these areas draws distinctions in 
the appropriate places. Participants in the fraud study, for example, were 
comfortable distinguishing between misrepresentations that went to the heart of 
the bargain and those that were extraneous. Elsewhere, however, we found 
significant divergence between the views of our lay subjects and current law. In 
the case of perjury, for example, lay participants were less likely than the law to 
distinguish between lying in court under oath and lying to police while not 
under oath, and between literally false statements and literally true but 
misleading statements. Similarly, with respect to bribery, participants’ views 
diverged significantly from current law. For example, respondents sought to 
criminalize both commercial bribery and payments accepted by an office-holder 
in return for performing a non-official act, despite the fact that neither form of 
conduct is a crime under current American federal law. 
I 
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES REGARDING WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 
It is often said that those who commit white collar crimes are subject to less 
severe punishments than those who commit street offenses.4 The usual 
implication seems to be that such disparities are somehow unjust.5 But, on 
reflection, it should be clear that treating a white collar crime less severely than 
a street crime would be unjust only if the white collar crime in question was no 
 
 4. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals in Federal 
Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982). 
 5. E.g., JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, 
CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126–29, 141–42 (8th ed. 2006). 
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less blameworthy than the corresponding street crime. The problem is assessing 
the relative blameworthiness of white collar crime. 
A handful of recent studies have sought to measure the blameworthiness of 
white collar crime in the eyes of the lay community. The data contained in this 
literature can be divided into three general categories: (1) data concerning 
perceptions of the relative seriousness of white collar crime compared to 
“street” crime; (2) data concerning perceptions of the relative seriousness of 
otherwise unrelated forms of white collar crime; and (3) data concerning 
perceptions of where the line should be drawn between white collar conduct 
that is treated as a crime and related white collar conduct that is not, and how 
the punishment for such related forms of white collar crime should be graded. 
One of the more carefully controlled studies of the first type was conducted 
by Kristy Holtfreter and colleagues.6 Subjects were asked, “[w]ho do you think 
should be punished more severely,” a person who commits a “street crime like 
robbery and steals $1,000,” or a person who commits a “white-collar crime like 
fraud and steals $1,000?” Subjects could also respond that the two crimes 
should “receive equal punishment.”7 The study reported that “65.4 percent of 
the sample felt violent offenders should receive harsher punishments.”8 
Unfortunately, the Holtfreter study has several significant limitations. One is 
that it seems to treat “fraud” as a proxy for white collar crime generally.9 
Although fraud is certainly an important white collar offense, it is only one of a 
collection of offenses typically designated as such, and no explanation is given 
for why attitudes about fraud seriousness should be regarded as an adequate 
stand-in for attitudes regarding white collar crime more broadly. A second 
limitation is that the study did not specify exactly what occurred during each 
offense. For example, robbery implies the use of force or violence and is often 
perpetrated by means of a weapon. It is therefore possible that subjects 
compounded the offense. It seems obvious, in any event, that robbery involves 
more serious wrongs and more serious harms than theft by means of deceit.10 
Thus, it is not surprising that a white collar offense, with no potential for 
 
 6. Kristy Holtfreter, Shanna Van Slyke, Jason Bratton & Marc Gertz, Public Perceptions of 
White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50 (2008). For studies employing a similar 
approach, see Francis T. Cullen, Jennifer L. Hartman & Cheryl Lero Johnson, Bad Guys: Why the 
Public Supports Punishing White-Collar Offenders, 51 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 31 (2008); Francis T. 
Cullen, Richard A. Mathers, Gregory A. Clark & John B. Cullen, Public Support for Punishing White-
Collar Crime: Blaming the Victim Revisited?, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 481 (1983). Some of this literature also 
focuses on differences in community attitudes towards white collar crime based on demographic 
factors, such as race, gender, income, political orientation, and the like. 
 7. Holtfreter et al., supra note 6, at 53. 
 8. Id. (emphasis removed).  
 9. Id. at 57. Though, to be fair, the study does suggest that “future research” should “includ[e] 
several different types of offenses.” 
 10. This point is discussed in a prior study conducted by the present authors, in which subjects were 
asked to compare the seriousness of twelve different means of committing a theft of a $350 bicycle. 
Green & Kugler, supra note 3. The two forms of robbery (armed robbery and simple robbery) were 
ranked first and fourth in terms of seriousness, respectively. The two forms of fraud (passing a bad 
check and false pretenses) were ranked ninth and tenth in terms of seriousness, respectively. 
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physical harm, would attract lesser condemnation than a potentially violent blue 
collar offense. Unfortunately, that does not tell us as much as we would like to 
know about the distinction between white collar and blue collar crime per se; 
there are too many other relevant factors.11 
The literature on community attitudes toward white collar crime also 
contains data concerning how people rate the comparative seriousness of 
essentially unrelated white collar crime behavior. The National Public Survey 
on White Collar Crime, conducted by the National White Collar Crime Center 
(NWCCC) in 2000 and again in 2005, is representative here. The study found, 
for example, that respondents rated an insurance agent’s fraud as more serious 
than a corporation’s reporting false quarterly earnings to increase the value of 
its stock, but less serious than a pharmaceutical company’s releasing a new drug 
while hiding information revealing important health and safety issues for 
consumers.12 Such findings, while interesting and relevant to policymakers in 
deciding how to enforce and punish various white collar crimes, do not directly 
address the kinds of concerns identified above regarding the distinction 
between closely related forms of white collar conduct. 
Only a handful of studies address the issue considered here—namely, where 
to draw the line between closely related white collar criminal and non-criminal 
acts. One is a study of community attitudes regarding “cartel behavior” 
conducted at the University of Melbourne Law School by Caron Beaton-Wells 
 
 11. In 2000, the National White Collar Crime Center took a similar, but less controlled, approach 
when it asked participants to compare the seriousness of twelve crimes, including a street crime that 
caused or threatened injury and two white collar crimes that caused injury. NAT’L WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME CTR., THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2000). Comparing armed 
robbery with selling tainted meat, forty-five percent of respondents said that selling tainted meat was 
more serious, thirty-six percent said that armed robbery was more serious, and nineteen percent said 
that they were equal in seriousness. Id. at 12. Comparing armed robbery with failing to recall a 
defective vehicle, forty-eight percent said that armed robbery was more serious, thirty-eight percent 
said that failing to recall a defective vehicle was more serious, and thirteen percent said that they were 
equal in seriousness. Id.  
  In 2005, the NWCCC conducted another study using a different set of twelve scenarios, some 
of which were presumed by the authors to be white collar crimes. NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., 
THE 2005 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2005). The scenarios included: (1) 
a corporation falsely reports its quarterly earnings, (2) a pharmaceutical company hides safety 
information about a new drug, (3) an insurance agent misrepresents coverage and grossly inflates costs, 
(4) a group of hackers steals patient information from a hospital and then sells it, and (5) a physician 
files false claims with an insurance company. One representative finding displays the limitations of this 
data: It was found that a bank teller’s embezzling $10,000 from a customer was more serious than a 
robbery of $100, and less serious than an offender’s attacking another person during a bar room fight 
and causing serious injury. Here we have three offenses, one presumably white collar, two not. The 
white collar offense falls between the two non-white collar offenses in terms of perceived seriousness. 
The three offenses, however, have virtually nothing in common. It is therefore inappropriate to draw 
any broad conclusions about the seriousness of white collar crime in general from comparing 
embezzlement to either of the other two offenses. For another study following a similar approach, see 
Nicole Leeper Piquero, Stephanie Carmichael & Alex R. Piquero, Assessing the Perceived Seriousness 
of White-Collar and Street Crimes, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 291 (2008). 
 12. THE 2005 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 11, at 15. 
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and colleagues.13 The Melbourne study focuses on three key forms of antitrust 
misconduct: price fixing, market allocation, and output restrictions. Subjects 
were asked to rank the seriousness of these three forms of conduct in 
comparison to each other, to others forms of white collar-type conduct, and to 
other forms of crime.14 The 2000 NWCCC study also addresses this sort of 
comparison between closely related white collar conduct. Respondents were 
asked to compare the seriousness of a bribe accepted by a public official to a 
bribe offered by a private citizen—an issue further considered below.15 In our 
view, the Melbourne and NWCCC studies reflect a useful approach to 
measuring community attitudes on several difficult issues in white collar crime. 
However, we think the studies would have been more useful if the scenarios 
had been pitched at a lower level of generality. 
II 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF ISSUES IN WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
To examine the distinctions between criminal and non-criminal activities 
within three domains of white collar offenses (bribery and gratuities; perjury 
and false statements; and fraud), we conducted four surveys. For each domain, 
we outline the legal standards by which the conduct is evaluated, describe 
potentially liminal cases, and present our empirical assessment of the views of 
lay participants toward these cases. This analysis aims to compare and contrast 
lay views and current legal standards. 
Respondents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service, 
which allowed for a diverse sample of American adults. Each study had a target 
sample of fifty respondents. Data were discarded if the respondent had an 
abnormally fast completion time (less than half of the median) or incorrectly 
answered a question intended to screen inattentive participants.16 Each study 
 
 13. Caron Beaton-Wells, Fiona Haines, Christine Parker & Chris Platania-Phung, Survey of Public 
Opinion on Cartel Criminalisation in Australia: Report of Preliminary Findings (2001), 
http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-survey. 
 14. Among the white collar offenses included were an insurance company denies a valid claim to 
save money; a company director uses his position dishonestly to gain personal advantage; a company 
misleads consumers about the safety of goods; a company fails to ensure worker safety; a company 
evades government income taxes; a person uses inside information in deciding to buy or sell shares. Id. 
 15. THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 11, at 7. Seventy-four 
percent of respondents said it was more serious for a public official to accept a bribe, 12% said it was 
more serious for a private citizen to give a bribe, and 14% said they were equally serious. As indicated 
supra text accompanying note 11, our findings on this issue were similar. 
 16. Cf. Daniel Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional Manipulation 
Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 
(2009). A question early in the study asked participants to rate three movies on a deliberately 
nonsensical scale. If participants read the directions immediately above the question, they would know 
to bypass it. If participants did answer the question, however, they were prompted to reread the 
directions and check their response. Those who did not then correct their response were marked as 
inattentive. Oppenheimer and colleagues show that those who miss such checks fail to notice subtle 
distinctions in survey materials whereas those who pass the check (either initially or after being 
prompted) are sensitive to such variations.  
GREEN&KUGLER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  3:10 PM 
38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:33 
began with a brief description of its procedure. Participants were told that the 
study evaluated how people act in various social situations. After giving their 
consent, participants were asked a question that instructed them to bypass, 
rather than answer it. Those who recorded an answer were marked as 
inattentive. Then, respondents completed a page of individual difference 
questions.17 
Following the individual difference measures, participants were given 
instructions describing the format of the scenarios. Participants were told they 
would view a core “story” with multiple possible “endings” and that it was for 
them to determine which distinctions, if any, were relevant. After each scenario, 
participants were asked three questions. First, they were asked to rate the moral 
blameworthiness of the described act on a scale ranging from 1-Not at All 
Blameworthy to 7-Very Blameworthy. Second, they were asked whether the act 
should be treated as criminal (Yes or No). Third, they were asked how severely, 
if at all, the person should be punished on a scale ranging from 1-No 
Punishment to 7-Severely Punished. 
Basic demographics (age, sex, occupation, educational attainment, state of 
residence) were collected at the end of the study. Participants were also asked a 
series of questions related to the set of scenarios presented in the study. For 
example, in the bribery study they were asked whether they had ever run for 
public office, held a position of responsibility at a larger firm, worked at a 
company with a gifts policy, been involved in lobbying, or given money to a 
political candidate. 
A. Studies on Bribery and Gratuities 
Since ancient times, virtually all systems of criminal law have criminalized 
bribery.18 Bribery corrupts institutions by inviting inappropriate grounds for 
decisionmaking. It creates political instability, distorts markets, undermines 
legitimacy, retards development, and leads to injustice, unfairness, and 
inefficiency.19 Traditionally, the offense has required a government official to 
accept a cash payment in return for agreeing to perform some official act.20 
Variations on the prototypical case raise numerous questions about the public’s 
attitudes towards bribery. 
First, in some of the most infamous cases of bribery, a briber is caught on 
tape offering or giving a bribee a briefcase full of cash in return for some official 
 
 17. C.G. Sibley & J. Duckitt, Big-Five Personality, Social Worldviews, and Ideological Attitudes: 
Further Tests of a Dual Process Cognitive-motivational Model, 149 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 545 (2009). These 
included self-rated political orientation (1-Very Conservative to 7-Very Liberal), faith in various public 
institutions (government, courts, defense attorneys; 1-Not much faith to 7-A lot of faith), and eight 
items from the Competitive World Beliefs scale (a measure of support for dog-eat-dog social Darwinist 
beliefs). 
 18. For a historical perspective, see generally JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES (1984). 
 19. GREEN, supra note 1, at 202. 
 20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (leading American bribery statute).  
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act. Although this is arguably the paradigmatic case, modern statutes typically 
define bribery more broadly to include offering “anything of value” to a public 
official with the intent of influencing an official act. The term “thing of value” 
has been read broadly to refer to a range of tangible and intangible things, such 
as offers of future employment, unsecured short-term (and subsequently 
repaid) loans, restaurant meals, tickets for athletic events, ostensibly valuable 
(but actually worthless) stock certificates, and sexual favors.21 Under current 
federal law, a defendant who accepts something of value other than cash or 
tangible property would be subject to the same potential punishment as 
someone who accepts cash or tangible property.22 One issue, then, is whether 
the public would agree that the acceptance of other kinds of things of value—
such as services, political endorsements, and contributions to a political 
campaign—should be regarded as equivalent to the acceptance of cash or 
tangible property. 
Second, bribery law has traditionally made it a crime to give something of 
value for the purpose of influencing an “official act.” Therefore, payments given 
to influence an unofficial act presumably do not constitute a bribe. But courts 
have disagreed about what constitutes an “official act.” Some courts have 
broadly construed the term to include acts that were not within the defendant’s 
official duties.23 Others have read the statute narrowly and excluded acts that 
were not sufficiently specific and pending.24 This raises the issue of the extent to 
which the lay public would regard as wrongful the payment of money to 
influence what we take to be an unofficial act, such as the giving of a political 
endorsement. 
Third, there may be a difference between soliciting or accepting a bribe, on 
the one hand, and offering or giving of a bribe, on the other. As Green has 
previously argued, soliciting or accepting a bribe involves a kind of disloyalty.25 
Public officials are supposed to work in the best interests of their constituents or 
institutions, rather than in the interests of third parties who tempt them. 
Offering or giving a bribe, by contrast, involves a different dynamic: The briber 
(in contrast to the bribee) normally does not have a duty of loyalty. Rather, he 
induces another person to be disloyal. As such, he acts as an accomplice by 
influencing, soliciting, inciting, or persuading another to do wrong. Other things 
being equal, it is arguably less wrongful to induce another to do a wrongful act 
 
 21. GREEN, supra note 1, at 199.  
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 
201(c)). 
 23. E.g., United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding Social Security 
Administration employee’s use of computer to fraudulently create documents was official act though 
outside her official duties); United States v. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Va. 2008) (finding 
congressman’s meeting with foreign and U.S. government officials to promote interests of companies 
with business interests in Africa constituted “official acts” within meaning of bribery statute). 
 24. E.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding police officer’s use of 
computer to search police database was not official act because it did not involve any matter then 
pending before the police department). 
 25. GREEN, supra note 1, at 203. 
GREEN&KUGLER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  3:10 PM 
40 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:33 
than to do the wrongful act oneself.26 For purposes of punishment, current law 
does not distinguish between taking and giving a bribe. Would the lay public 
nevertheless recognize such a distinction? 
Fourth, as traditionally understood, bribery consists of a bilateral agreement 
or quid pro quo in which the bribee solicits or accepts something of value from 
the briber in exchange for the bribee’s acting, or agreeing to act, on the briber’s 
behalf. This exchange requires a meeting of the minds, with the bribee agreeing 
to “be influenced” in the performance of an official act. Sometimes, however, 
people give money and other things to public officials not in return for 
something specific, but merely as a gift or gratuity. Sometimes, the gift-giver is 
trying to obtain goodwill. Other times, she is genuinely trying to say “thank 
you” to the official for an unsolicited favorable act (and perhaps to buy 
continued goodwill). Federal law distinguishes between giving or offering 
something of value “for the purpose of influencing” an official act and doing so 
“for or because of any official act.”27 The first act involves a quid pro quo and 
constitutes true bribery. Under federal law, it can result in a sentence of up to 
fifteen years in prison. The second act is a mere gratuity. The convicted 
defendant faces a maximum penalty of only two years. One issue, then, is 
whether the lay public accepts the distinction made by the federal statute. 
Finally, bribery has traditionally involved the offer or payment of money to 
a “public official,” defined under the leading federal statute as a member of 
Congress, or official or employee of any branch of the federal government.28 
The statute also applies to jurors, witnesses, and non-government employees 
who occupy a position of trust with federal responsibilities, as in the case of an 
employee of a private nonprofit organization that administered a sub-grant of a 
municipality’s federal block grant.29 Yet there is a noticeable trend toward 
criminalizing bribery in the commercial context. For example, federal law now 
criminalizes bribes accepted by investment advisors, contestants in television 
game shows, bank employees, sellers of alcoholic beverages, labor union 
officials, railroad employees, and radio disc jockeys.30 Several states have 
bribery statutes that apply to commercial contexts more generally.31 The 
recently passed United Kingdom Bribery Act makes bribery a crime not only 
for government officials, but also for persons in business.32 This raises the issue 
 
 26. Id. at 209. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 28. Id. § 201(a)(1). 
 29. Id. § 201(b)(3), (4); Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984). 
 30. Id. § 215; id. § 205(c); 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2006); 49 U.S.C. § 11907 (2006). 
 31. For example, Texas law makes it a felony for a fiduciary, such as an agent, employee, trustee, 
guardian, lawyer, physician, officer, director, partner, or manager to accept or agree to accept any 
benefit from another person “on agreement or understanding that the benefit will influence the 
conduct of the fiduciary in relation to the affairs of his beneficiary.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 
(West 2011).  
 32. U.K. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 3(2)(b) (Eng.).  
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of the extent to which the public regards a bribe paid to a private employee in a 
commercial context as comparable to a bribe paid to a government official in 
the public context. 
The above-discussed legal distinctions provide a large number of bribery-
related questions to consider. Therefore, we address bribery in two separate 
data collections. In the first, we address the first and second issues identified 
above. In the second, we address issues three through five. 
1. Bribery and Gratuities Study #1: Methods 
The first set of scenarios concerned two issues: the wrongfulness of a 
bribee’s accepting a direct payment of cash or other tangible property 
compared to the bribee’s accepting a non-property-related thing of value or 
receiving a thing of value only indirectly; and the blameworthiness of accepting 
things of value in exchange for official acts versus accepting things of value in 
exchange for unofficial acts. 
Given that the leading American statute makes it a crime for a public 
official to accept “anything of value” with intent to be influenced in an official 
act,33 we wanted to know how respondents’ culpability determinations would 
change if we varied the nature of the thing of value. Thus, in one scenario, the 
putative briber, a company chief executive officer (CEO) named Reeves, wants 
the putative bribee, a state legislator named Smith, to vote against legislation 
that would hurt Reeves’ firm. In one variation, Reeves offered Smith $20,000 
cash; in a second, Reeves offered $20,000 worth of renovations to Smith’s home; 
in a third, Reeves offered an (otherwise legal) $20,000 campaign contribution; 
and in a fourth, Reeves promised an endorsement in the next campaign. We 
predicted that subjects would view the payment of cash as most wrongful, with 
the in-kind home renovations a close second. A campaign contribution seemed 
more likely to fall outside the scope of bribery. The American political system, 
for better or worse, runs on campaign contributions, and although such 
contributions are not technically supposed to be given in return for specific 
promises, we anticipated that many subjects would not distinguish between 
campaign contributions given with and without strings. Additionally, we 
predicted that subjects would assume that the campaign contribution would not 
personally benefit the would-be bribee, but would instead be used to run his 
campaign. We thought that the promised endorsement would not be viewed as 
bribery, but rather as merely “politics as usual,” an example of “you scratch my 
back, and I’ll scratch yours.” 
As described earlier, only money given in return for the performance of an 
“official act” counts as bribery under federal law.34 We wanted to know the 
extent, if any, to which our subjects would also think it was wrongful to give 
money in return for the performance of an unofficial act. To this end, we 
formulated a set of scenarios in which Smith, still a member of the state 
 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 34. Id. § 201(a)(3). 
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legislature, is approached by Johnson, a CEO who wants to run for mayor. 
Johnson seeks Smith’s endorsement, which we assume is not an official act 
(though we should say that we have not found any law directly on point). In 
return for Smith’s endorsement, Johnson offers the same list of inducements as 
in the previous scenario: cash, in-kind home renovations, a campaign 
contribution, and a mutual political endorsement. We predicted that, other 
things being equal, our subjects would rank the payment in return for an 
unofficial act as considerably less wrongful than payment for an official act. 
Fifty participants were recruited for this study from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service. Data from one participant were discarded due to an abnormally 
fast completion time (less than half the median).35 Of the remaining forty-nine 
participants (twenty male, twenty-nine female), the median age was thirty-six. 
Fifty-three percent of participants had college degrees. The procedures 
followed were as described above. The official and unofficial act stories were 
presented on separate pages in counterbalanced order. The scenarios and their 
various endings were not labeled. 
2. Bribery and Gratuities Study #1: Results 
Table 1 summarizes the study results, including the mean scores for the 
blameworthiness and punishment measures and the percentage of participants 
indicating that each act should be a criminal offense. Blameworthiness and 
punishment were both higher when the offer was made for an official act than 
for an unofficial one.36 A high percentage of respondents (approximately ninety 
percent) said that offering money for a vote on legislation (an official act) 
should be treated as a crime. A similarly high percentage said that offering 
money for a political endorsement (which we regarded as an unofficial act) 
should be treated as a crime. This was surprising and seemingly inconsistent 
with current law, which does not treat payment for what we assume to be a non-
official act, such as a political endorsement, as a bribe. 
 
  
 
 35. Cf. Oppenheimer et al., supra note 16, at 867. 
 36. The data on blameworthiness and punishment severity were analyzed using a repeated-
measures ANOVA, with a two (official vs. unofficial act) by four (various means) design. The main 
effect of official versus unofficial act was significant for both blameworthiness F(1, 48) = 32.18, p < .001 
and punishment F(1, 48) = 60.09, p < .001. 
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Table 1: Ratings of Official versus Unofficial Act Scenarios in Terms of 
Blameworthiness, Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the Sample 
Criminalizing the Activity 
Agreeing to Give 
In Exchange 
for Accepting 
Blameworthiness Punishment 
Percent 
Criminalizing 
A Vote on Bill 
(an official act) 
Money 6.41a (0.91) 5.71a (1.37) 95.9%a 
Home 
Renovations 
5.88b (1.42) 4.92b (1.54) 91.8%a  
Campaign 
Contribution 
5.43c (1.34) 3.98c (1.80) 73.5%b 
Endorsement 4.80d (1.77) 2.94d (1.88) 36.7%c  
An Endorsement 
(an unofficial act) 
Money 6.12a (1.20) 5.08a (1.74) 89.8%a  
Home 
Renovations 
5.49b (1.65) 4.18b (1.79) 77.6%a  
 Campaign 
Contribution 
4.69c (1.70) 2.61c (1.64) 42.9%b  
 
Endorsement 3.16d (1.74) 1.45d (0.84)  8.2%c 
Note: For each type of act (official vs. unofficial), scores for a given dependent 
variable that do not share subscripts are significantly different from each other. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Blameworthiness and punishment scores are 
on scales ranging from one to seven. 
 
The percentage of the sample criminalizing an activity and the 
blameworthiness and punishment ratings varied as a function of the means by 
which the act was solicited. Judgments of criminality followed the same pattern, 
so they will be discussed together.37 When the bribee accepted an offer of cash, 
over ninety percent of our subjects said that the act should be treated as a 
crime, regardless of whether it was an official or (presumably) unofficial act. 
When an offer of home renovations was accepted, a similarly large percentage 
said that it should be a crime to agree to perform an official act; significantly 
fewer (about seventy-eight percent) said that it should be a crime when the 
agreement was for an endorsement.38 Over seventy percent said that accepting a 
campaign contribution in return for performing an official act should be treated 
as a crime, but only slightly more than forty percent said that accepting a 
campaign contribution in return for giving an endorsement should be treated as 
 
 37. The effect of bribery means was also significant for both blameworthiness F(2.2, 106) = 60.98, p 
< .001 and punishment F(2.1, 102) = 91.70, p < .001. Due to a sphericity violation, the Greenhouse–
Geisser correction was used for the relevant blameworthiness and punishment analyses. 
 38. Responses to the yes or no question asking whether the act should be treated as a crime were 
analyzed using a repeated measures chi-squared in all studies.  
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a crime (perhaps because both acts involved an explicitly political process). 
When the bribee accepted the offer of an endorsement, thirty-five percent said 
that it should be a crime if an official act was requested, and less than ten 
percent said it should be a crime if an unofficial act was requested. 
We also investigated the role of individual difference factors in shaping 
bribery attitudes. We created separate composite variables for the criminality, 
blameworthiness, and punishment ratings for the official and unofficial acts. For 
example, we averaged the four blameworthiness scores for each of the public 
act cases to create an overall public blameworthiness score. In the case of the 
criminality data, we scored a scenario marked as a crime as a one and a scenario 
marked as no crime as a zero. Thus, the criminality averages reflect the 
proportion of scenarios marked as crimes. 
We then probed the relationship between individual difference measures 
and each of the six composites (three for each act type) in a two-step process. 
First, we examined the simple bi-variate correlations between the composites 
and measures of educational attainment, sex, competitive world beliefs, political 
orientation, and faith in various institutions. The individual difference items 
that correlated with any of the dependent measures were then used as 
predictors in a multiple regression. Predictors that were not significant in the 
initial regression were removed from the final regression model.39 As was also 
seen in subsequent studies, there were remarkably few significant effects. In this 
study, the only variable that predicted views of either set of scenarios was 
whether the participant had ever worked at a company that had a gift policy. If 
the participant had, then they were more likely to criminalize (β = .42, p < .01), 
and more severely blame (β = .34, p < .05), and punish (β = .32, p < .05) 
attempts to influence the unofficial act. There was no such effect on attempts to 
influence public actors. That the presence of a gift policy affected judgments for 
the unofficial act but not the official act may in part be due to the relative lack 
of ambivalence in responses to the official act. The overwhelming majority of 
the sample was highly critical of attempts to influence a vote on a bill, which 
sharply limited the potential role of individual differences. 
Previous research has sometimes found that differences in punitiveness 
toward white collar offenders depended on the gender, race, or educational 
attainment of the participant.40 In these studies, we did not find differences 
based on gender or educational attainment. Given our comparatively small 
sample size, we cannot assume that such differences do not exist, rather only 
that, if they do exist, the differences are likely small. The samples were not large 
 
 39.  The use of multiple regression analysis was intended to deal with the conceptual overlap of 
some of the individual difference measures. For example, in the fraud study, both social and economic 
conservatism correlated with ratings of criminality, but only economic conservatism was a significant 
predictor in the multiple regression; social conservatism only affected judgments of criminality to the 
extent that it reflected economic conservatism. 
 40.  For a useful summary, see Holtfreter et al., supra note 6, at 52; see also James D. Unnever, 
Michael L. Benson & Francis T. Cullen, Public Support for Getting Tough on Corporate Crime: Racial 
and Political Divides, 45 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 163 (2008). 
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enough to test meaningfully for ethnic differences. 
3. Bribery and Gratuities Study #2: Methods 
The second set of scenarios concerned three issues: the wrongfulness of 
accepting money or other things of value as a quid pro quo versus accepting 
money or other things of value as a mere gift; the wrongfulness of a bribe 
accepted by a public official versus a bribe accepted by an official of a private 
company; and the wrongfulness of soliciting or accepting a bribe versus offering 
or giving a bribe. 
Federal law draws a significant distinction between giving or offering 
something of value “for the purpose of influencing” an official act and giving or 
offering something of value “for or because of any official act.”41 The first act 
involves a quid pro quo and constitutes true bribery; it can result in a sentence 
of up to fifteen years in prison. The second act is a mere gratuity with a 
maximum penalty of two years. We wanted to see if our subjects would make a 
similar distinction. We devised a set of scenarios in which the gift-giver (CEO 
Larson) either has or has not had contact with the gift-recipient (state legislator 
Jones) prior to the recipient’s official act (a vote on the location of a new 
government office building). The scenario with prior contact describes a direct 
bribe: money is offered in advance as a quid pro quo. In the scenario without 
prior contact, the gift-giver gives a “thank you” gift of $20,000 after the vote. 
The gift giver did not have a direct expectation of future services. We tested two 
variations of the gratuity scenario. In one, the recipient has announced that he 
will soon be retiring from office, which largely removes the possibility of future 
inappropriate influence from the gratuity. In the other variation, the recipient 
has no plans to retire and the gift giver is said to hope that his gift will “help his 
company maintain good relations” with the recipient. We predicted that our 
subjects would rate accepting a gratuity as less blameworthy than accepting a 
bribe, and would rate the case in which the gift recipient would remain in office 
as more blameworthy than that in which the recipient was about to retire. 
Although bribery has traditionally involved the acceptance of money by a 
“public official,” there has been a trend toward criminalizing bribery in the 
commercial context. To determine how our subjects would view the 
wrongfulness of commercial bribery, we formulated a set of parallel scenarios in 
which CEO Larson is interacting with Heller, a board member of another 
company. Heller is voting on the location of a new office building, but this time, 
it is a private office building and the government is not involved. There were 
three variants: a bribe, a gratuity to the retiring employee, and a gratuity to the 
employee with no plans of retiring. 
In all of these scenarios, the focus was on the culpability of the person 
receiving the bribe or gratuity. But most statutes also make it a crime to offer or 
give a bribe or gratuity, and, for purposes of punishment, do not distinguish 
between the two acts. Thus, we posed an additional set of questions that asked 
 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), (c) (2006). 
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subjects to assess the wrongfulness of Larson’s offering the bribe to the state 
legislator. We expected most subjects to view accepting a bribe as more 
wrongful than giving a bribe since only the former typically involves a breach of 
loyalty; the latter presumably involves the aiding and abetting of another in his 
wrongful act. 
The methodology for the second bribery study paralleled the first study. 
Fifty-two participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. 
Data from three were discarded due to abnormally fast completion times (less 
than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question intended to screen 
inattentive participants. Of the remaining forty-nine participants (fifteen male, 
thirty-four female), the median age was thirty-three. Fifty-one percent of 
participants had college degrees. 
Participants were told they would view a core “story” with multiple possible 
“endings,” and that they should determine which distinctions, if any, were 
relevant. The stories about the government official (Legislator Jones) and 
corporate employee (Heller) were presented on separate pages in 
counterbalanced order. The questions about the wrongfulness of offering the 
bribe to the state legislator were always last. 
4. Bribery and Gratuities Study #2: Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the study. The government official was 
judged to be more blameworthy and deserving of more punishment than the 
corporate employee.42 The distinction between bribes in the government 
context and bribes in the commercial context was less significant than expected. 
When the bribe was accepted by a board member of a large company, nearly 
eighty percent of our subjects said that this should be treated as a crime. 
Although this was slightly less than in the context of the bribe accepted by a 
public official, eighty percent is still substantial. This was a striking finding given 
that federal law does not make such conduct a crime at all, at least not under a 
bribery statue.43 Attitudes of the American lay public were more consistent with 
United Kingdom law, which, under the Bribery Act of 2010, treats commercial 
bribery as indistinguishable from bribery in the public realm.44 It is also worth 
noting that a significant number of respondents (about thirty-five percent) 
believed that gratuities given in the commercial realm should be regarded as 
criminal. 
 
 42. The data on blameworthiness and punishment severity were again analyzed using a repeated-
measures ANOVA, this time with a two (government official versus corporate employee) by three 
(various means) design. The case of the briber was set aside for this analysis. Blameworthiness F(1, 48) 
= 9.38, p < .01 and punishment F(1, 48) = 21.18, p < .001 varied as a function of whether the official 
worked for the government or a private corporation. Blameworthiness F(1.5, 73) = 50.14, p < .001 and 
punishment F(1, 72) = 78.36, p < .001 also varied depending on whether the exchange between giver 
and taker constituted a bribe or merely a gratuity. Greenhouse–Geisser was used in these analyses. 
 43. If a private official makes a decision that runs against the best interests of his company in 
return for taking money for his own benefit, he may have breached a fiduciary duty to the company’s 
shareholders, and thus be potentially liable for a different offense. 
 44. U.K. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.). 
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Table 2: Ratings of Public versus Private Scenarios in Terms of 
Blameworthiness, Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the Sample 
Criminalizing the Activity 
 
 
Blameworthiness Punishment 
Percent 
Criminalizing 
Payment 
Accepted 
by Public 
Official 
Payment given as 
quid pro quo 
6.67a (1.05) 5.90a (1.37) 95.9%a 
Payment given as 
gift, recipient not 
retiring 
5.12b (2.00) 4.02b (2.15) 63.3%b 
  Payment given as 
gift, recipient 
retiring 
4.57c (2.15) 3.29c (2.08) 51.0%b 
Offering 
Payment 
to Public 
Official 
Payment given as 
quid pro quo 
6.45a (1.32) 5.57a (1.73) 93.9%a 
Payment 
Accepted 
by 
Corporate 
Employee 
Payment given as 
quid pro quo  
6.06a (1.72) 4.88a (1.88) 79.6%a 
Payment given as 
gift, recipient not 
retiring 
4.27b (2.22) 3.06b (2.01) 36.7%b 
  Payment given as 
gift, recipient 
retiring  
3.76c (2.20) 2.35c (1.75) 22.4%c 
Note: For each type of official, scores for a given dependent variable that do not 
share subscripts are significantly different from each other. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. Blameworthiness and punishment scores are on scales ranging 
from one to seven. 
 
All else being equal, respondents always rated the acceptance of a quid pro 
quo payment as significantly more blameworthy than the acceptance of a gift. 
Indeed, the difference between a quid pro quo and a gift was greater than the 
difference between a quid pro quo accepted by a government official and one 
accepted by a corporate employee. Distinguishing between quid pro quo 
payments and gifts is consistent with current federal law. 
Finally, there were no significant differences between how respondents 
viewed the blameworthiness of bribers compared to bribees. This is consistent 
with current U.S. law, but runs counter to our hypothesis: We expected the 
bribee to be judged more harshly than the briber because the bribee is the one 
betraying a trust whereas the briber is merely inducing the bribee to do so. Such 
judgments might have been counter-balanced, however, by the fact that the 
briber showed “initiative” that the bribee arguably did not. 
To analyze individual differences for this study, we created separate 
composites for the private and public bribee cases and combined the bribery 
and gratuity cases for each. Two individual difference factors were significant. 
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When the receiver of funds was a private employee, a subject who had worked 
at a company with a gift policy was more likely to criminalize the private 
official’s actions (β = .27, p = .05), rate them as blameworthy (β = .36, p < .05), 
and assign harsher punishments (β = .37, p < .05). Subjects with a high score in 
competitive world beliefs were somewhat less likely to criminalize a private 
official accepting money (β = .27, p = .05), but competitive world beliefs did not 
have an effect on the other measures. When the receiver of funds was a public 
official, the same two factors were relevant. Subjects who had worked at a 
company with a gift policy were more likely to criminalize the official’s actions 
(β = .32, p < .05) and rate them as highly blameworthy (β = .34, p < .05). 
Participants high in competitive world beliefs were again less likely to 
criminalize the official’s actions (β = .39, p < .01) or rate them as highly 
blameworthy (β = .39, p < .01). Gift policies and competitiveness did not 
significantly affect preferred punishment for the public official. 
B. Study on Perjury and False Statements 
Under U.S. federal and analogous state law, two main offenses involve lying 
in the context of government procedures. The first, perjury, consists of willfully 
making a false material statement while under oath, typically in a judicial or 
legislative proceeding.45 Case law makes it clear that in order to qualify as 
perjury, a statement must be literally false rather than merely misleading.46 
Under the federal perjury statute, the punishment is a maximum of five years in 
prison. The second offense, false statements, consists of making a false 
statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a government agency, including 
in the context of a law enforcement investigation.47 The defendant need not be 
under oath. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, a 
majority of lower courts have held that, as in the case of perjury, a false 
statement must be literally false;48 a minority of lower courts have held to the 
contrary.49 Under the leading federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the punishment 
for false statements is also a maximum of five years (unless it involves terrorism, 
in which case the maximum sentence is eight years).50 We wanted to know how, 
other things being equal, the public would regard the wrongfulness of lying in 
court under oath compared with lying to law enforcement officials while not 
under oath. In addition, we wanted to know the extent to which our subjects 
would, if all else were equal, distinguish between literally false statements and 
literally true but misleading statements. 
 
 45. The federal statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). 
 46. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). Under federal law, the false statement is typically made to a 
government entity or official, such as an FBI, IRS, or SEC agent; under analogous state law, it is 
typically made to a state or local entity or official, such as a police officer. 
 48. United States v. Gahagan, 881 F.2d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vesaas, 586 
F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1975).  
 49. E.g., United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
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We were also interested in the effect of the perjury or false statements: 
Specifically, should it matter whether a witness’s lie leads to a third party being 
falsely inculpated (and therefore unjustly convicted) or, conversely, to a third 
party being falsely exculpated (and therefore unjustly acquitted)? Our legal 
culture traditionally views wrongful conviction as worse than wrongful 
acquittal.51 In the past, federal law treated certain kinds of falsely exculpatory 
statements as exempt from criminal prosecution.52 But, under current federal 
law, false statements that have the effect of unjustly exculpating are treated no 
less harshly than false statements that have the effect of unjustly inculpating. 
We wanted to see whether lay subjects would recognize the inculpation–
exculpation distinction. 
To test the three key questions concerning perjury and false statements, we 
formulated a range of related scenarios. In all of them, a man named Walt 
witnessed an automobile theft near his home. At the time of the theft, Walt 
would normally have been at work. His company has a strict attendance policy 
and he risked being terminated were it known that he had been late on the day 
in question. Walt was therefore motivated to conceal his whereabouts on the 
day of the crime and not cooperate with authorities. In all cases, the main 
suspect in the crime was Dave, a man Walt did not know. 
We wished to explore the distinction between making a literally false 
statement and making a literally true (though misleading) statement. 
Accordingly, in one variation, Walt was called as a witness by the prosecution in 
a criminal trial, and offered (exculpatory) testimony that was literally false: he 
said he was not at home and did not witness the crime. In actuality, he did see 
Dave commit it. In the other variation, Walt offered testimony that, though 
misleading, was literally true: he said that he normally left for work by the time 
the theft occurred. The prosecutor took that to mean that he did not witness the 
theft. In each case, we stated that Dave was acquitted despite his guilt. We 
predicted that, other things being equal, subjects would rate the literally false 
statement as more wrongful than the merely misleading one. Green has 
previously characterized this as the principle of caveat auditor: In certain 
circumstances, a listener is responsible or partly responsible for ascertaining a 
statement’s truth before believing it. This principle applies to cases of merely 
misleading statements but not to lying.53 When A lies to B, A is telling B that A 
believes what A is saying. If A is mistaken about her own assertion or is lying, 
 
 51. See Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). The Hebrew Bible says 
that a witness who falsely inculpates is to receive the same punishment as that which would have been 
given to the falsely accused; no such similar punishment is applicable for statements that are falsely 
exculpating. Deuteronomy 19:18–19. 
 52. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (repudiating judicially created “exculpatory 
no” doctrine, under which a statement that would otherwise violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was exempt from 
prosecution if it conveyed false information in a situation in which a truthful reply would have 
incriminated the interrogee, and if it was limited to simple words of denial rather than more elaborate 
fabrications).  
 53. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 78. 
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then A is wholly responsible for B’s false belief. But if A merely misleads B 
without making an assertion, A has not told B that A believes what A is saying 
(since what A is saying is neither true nor false). Thus, it is partially B’s fault for 
relying on an assertion that A has not made. The underlying idea, as explained 
by Jonathan Adler, is “that each individual is a rational, autonomous being and 
so fully responsible for the inferences he draws, just as he is for his acts. It is 
deception, but not lies, that require mistaken inferences and so the hearer’s 
responsibility.”54 We also wanted to know how the subjects would regard the 
wrongfulness of lying in court under oath compared with lying to the police 
while not under oath. As a baseline, we used the aforementioned scenario in 
which Walt is called as a witness by the prosecution. Walt was explicitly 
described as swearing to tell the truth and then lying. We also created a 
variation in which the police questioned Walt at the initial stage of the 
investigation. He again lies, but this time he is not under oath. Because of his 
lie, the police do not pursue an investigation of Dave; the guilty man is free of 
suspicion. We predicted that all else being equal, subjects would rate lying 
under oath in a court proceeding as more wrongful than lying to police when 
not under oath. We surmised that violating a sworn oath would add to the 
wrongfulness of the act. 
Finally, we explored the difference between testimony that is falsely 
exculpatory and that which is falsely inculpatory. In all of the previous 
scenarios, Walt’s various statements had the effect of helping to unjustly acquit 
or divert suspicion from a guilty man. An additional variant placed Walt in a 
courtroom under oath, but this time, he made a literally false statement. The 
statement had the effect of allowing an innocent man to be convicted (he 
testified that he did not witness the crime when, in fact, he saw someone other 
than Dave commit it). We predicted that false statements that were falsely 
inculpatory would be rated as significantly more wrongful than false statements 
that were exculpatory. We thought that our subjects’ judgments would be 
informed by the common maxim that “it is better that [five, ten, twenty, or a 
hundred] guilty men go free than that one innocent man be convicted.” 
1. Perjury and False Statements Study: Methods 
The method for the perjury and false statements study closely paralleled the 
method for the prior studies. Fifty-one participants were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Data from two were discarded due to 
abnormally fast completion times (less than the median) or incorrectly 
answering a question intended to screen inattentive participants. Of the 
remaining forty-nine (twenty male, twenty-nine female), the median age was 
thirty-three. Forty-nine percent of participants had college degrees. 
Participants were told they would view a core “story” with multiple possible 
“endings” and that they should determine which distinctions, if any, were 
 
 54. Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHILOSOPHY 435, 437 (1997). 
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relevant. The demographics page for this study also asked participants whether 
they had ever testified in court or been questioned by the police. 
2. Perjury and False Statements Study: Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results and shows that blameworthiness scores were 
high for all versions of the scenario. In all of the versions containing a direct lie, 
Walt was rated within one interval of the top of the scale. Thus, while some lies 
may have been seen as more blameworthy than others, all were viewed as 
sufficiently wrong to reach the ceiling of the scale, thereby obscuring potential 
differences between the lies. The version in which Walt merely misleads the 
court, however, was seen as less blameworthy than all of the others (including 
the parallel case in which he lied).55 
 
Table 3: Ratings of Perjury and False Statements Scenarios in Terms of 
Blameworthiness, Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the Sample 
Criminalizing the activity. 
 Blameworthiness Punishment 
Percent 
Criminalizing 
Lie to Court, Exculpatory 6.45a (1.08) 4.12b (1.39) 93.9%a 
Lie to Court, Inculpatory 6.47a (1.08) 4.63a (1.58)  89.8%ab 
Lie to Police, Exculpatory 6.14a (1.15) 3.80b (1.73) 77.6%b 
Mislead Court, Exculpatory 5.39b (1.71) 3.08c (1.68) 59.2%c 
Note: For each dependent variable, scores that do not share subscripts are 
significantly different from each other. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Blameworthiness and punishment scores are on scales ranging from one to seven. 
 
Punishment scores varied substantially more than blameworthiness scores. 
As expected, a lie to a court that had an unjustly inculpatory effect was seen as 
deserving greater punishment than a lie that had an unjustly exculpatory effect. 
Additionally, a misleading statement with an exculpatory effect was seen as 
deserving less punishment than a lie with an exculpatory effect. Contrary to 
predictions, there was not a significant difference between a lie to a court with 
an exculpatory effect and a lie to the police with the same exculpatory effect. 
A majority of subjects thought that lying to police when not under oath 
should be treated as a crime, though less than those who wanted to see lying 
under oath treated as a crime. We think the distinction reflects the fact that, in 
the case of perjury, the defendant has sworn to tell the truth, and the perception 
that, other things being equal, lying in court might pose a greater potential for 
harm than lying to the police. Inasmuch as subjects regarded perjury as the 
more serious crime, their views were inconsistent with federal law, which 
 
 55. The data on blameworthiness and punishment severity were analyzed using a repeated 
measures ANOVA. Scores varied across condition for both blameworthiness F(2, 116) = 14.79, p < .001 
and punishment F(3, 144) = 17.58, p < .001. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used in the 
blameworthiness analyses. 
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regards false statements and perjury as equivalent in seriousness (both offenses 
have a maximum of penalty of five years in prison, except when false statements 
involves terrorism, in which case the maximum penalty is eight years). 
The percentage of subjects who wanted to criminalize the conduct in each 
version of the scenario was revealing. More respondents wished to criminalize 
literally false statements to the court than wished to criminalize literally true 
though misleading statements to the court. This corresponds to the moral 
distinction between lying and merely misleading. Nevertheless, a majority of 
subjects wished to criminalize even misleading statements made under oath. 
This finding suggests a divergence between community attitudes and current 
law. 
We examined the individual difference data in this study at the overall level 
by creating a single set of composites across all four scenarios, and at the 
individual level by looking at each scenario separately. Individual difference 
measures did not significantly relate to criminality, blameworthiness, or 
punishment judgments in either approach. 
C. Study on Fraud 
The term “fraud” has a wide range of meanings in Anglo-American criminal 
law. At its core, fraud consists of the misappropriation of money or property by 
means of deceit. But fraud is also often defined more broadly to include (1) acts 
aimed at objects other than the misappropriation of property (such as the 
deprivation of honest services, obstruction of governmental functions, and 
obtaining of unjust advantage), and (2) acts committed by means other than 
deception (such as breach of trust, conflicts of interest, and exploitation).56 As a 
result, the concept of fraud is both ubiquitous and elusive. 
We focused this study on what we took to be the core sense of fraud: theft 
by deception. Even within this core conception, the precise boundaries of fraud 
can be hard to pin down. Our free market system tends to respect and reward 
aggressive business practices. What constitutes true fraud can be difficult to 
distinguish from “sharp dealing,” “puffing,” or “seller’s talk.” The question, 
then, is how to distinguish between cases of misrepresentation that constitute 
criminal fraud and cases that do not. 
The law has traditionally required that, to be fraudulent, a misleading 
statement or lie must be material, in that it concerns the price, quantity, 
effectiveness, or quality of the goods or services in question. The fraud must go 
to the nature of the bargain itself, rather than to the circumstances surrounding 
the bargain. For example, in a leading Second Circuit case, the defendants were 
in the business of selling stationery supplies through salesmen who solicited 
orders by telephone.57 In order to “get past” the secretaries who answered the 
 
 56. Though the recent decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), has limited the 
scope of federal mail fraud, in holding that the honest services fraud criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
applies only to bribery or kickbacks and not to other fraudulent deprivations of intangible rights. 
 57. United States v. Regent Office Supply, 421 F.2d 1174 (2d. Cir. 1970). 
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phone and speak to the purchasing agents directly, the salesmen would make 
false representations by saying that they had been “referred” to the customer 
by a mutual friend or another customer, or that they were “stuck” with 
stationery ordered by a customer who had died. While not condoning the use of 
such misrepresentations as a matter of business ethics, the Second Circuit held 
that they did not constitute criminal fraud, since, crucially, there was no 
evidence that any of the misrepresentations had been “directed to the quality, 
adequacy or price of goods to be sold, or otherwise to the nature of the 
bargain.”58 
We wanted to see whether the public would agree that the line between 
criminal fraud and unethical business practices should be drawn where the 
Second Circuit and other courts have placed it.59 We also wanted to know 
whether the distinction between material and non-material misrepresentations 
was sufficiently fine-grained. In particular, we were interested in seeing if our 
subjects would regard certain misrepresentations regarding the quality, 
adequacy, or price of goods as more serious than others. 
Another issue in the law of fraud concerns the distinction between deceptive 
affirmative statements and deceptive omissions. A fraud can be premised on 
either, but a material omission is fraudulent only when there is a duty to 
disclose or when the omission has the effect of making an affirmative statement 
misleading by implication.60 Once an omission has been determined to be 
fraudulent, however, it is treated the same as a deceptive affirmative statement. 
We wanted to know the extent to which the public would regard various kinds 
of omission as fraudulent and how they thought omissions should be punished. 
Finally, under current law, the usual maximum penalty for mail fraud is 
twenty years in prison.61 Theoretically, such penalties could apply regardless of 
the value of the property stolen, but in practice, the value of the property 
obtained is relevant under Sentencing Guidelines.62 We investigated the extent 
to which, all else being equal, the value of property involved would affect 
judgments about the appropriate punishment. 
We created two parallel sets of scenarios involving potentially fraudulent 
statements made in connection with the sale of a good. One set involved the 
sale of an $800 laptop computer. The other set involved the sale of a $40,000 
automobile. We predicted that, other things being equal, subjects would rank 
fraud committed in connection with the more expensive item as more 
blameworthy than fraud committed in connection with the less expensive item. 
 
 58. Id. at 1179. 
 59. United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 
284–85 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 60. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1195 (1986). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). If the fraud occurs in the context of a national emergency or affects a 
financial institution, the maximum penalty is thirty years. 
 62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2011). 
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We expected scenarios involving misrepresentations of quality to be judged 
as most deserving of punishment. We distinguished between defects that 
involved the particular good being sold and defects that involved the model 
more generally. Thus, in one variation, the salesperson tells his would-be 
customer that the product (whether the laptop or automobile) is a new, brand 
name model, when it is really a refurbished model made with off-brand parts. In 
another variation, the salesperson knowingly sells a product with a defective 
part. In a third, the salesperson is directly asked whether the model (whether 
the laptop or automobile) is known to have a specific problem: a tendency to 
overheat (in the case of the laptop) or a tendency to burn oil (in the case of the 
car). The salesperson assures the customer that it does not, even though the 
salesperson knows that the model suffers from that problem. In a variation of 
this last scenario, we had a case in which the salesperson is not asked about the 
problem with the model and merely omits mentioning it. Here, we predicted 
that our subjects would rate the omission as deserving less punishment than the 
corresponding affirmative misstatements. 
We predicted that scenarios involving two variants of “seller’s talk” would 
be evaluated as substantially less serious. In one, the salesperson tells the 
customer that the actual price of the good in question is higher than the special 
sale price that he is offering to the customer ($1,000 versus $800 in the case of 
the computer; $45,000 versus $40,000 in the case of the car), when in fact, the 
lower price is the normal price. In the other, the salesperson tells his customer 
that the product in question is “very popular among important business people 
in New York City,” even though he knows this is not true. Both of these 
statements are direct lies, but neither distorts the quality of the good in 
question; they are not relevant to the fundamental bargain. We expected that 
subjects would not believe them to be worthy of criminalization. 
1. Fraud Study: Methods 
The methodology for the fraud study closely paralleled the methodology for 
the prior studies. Fifty participants (sixteen male, thirty-four female) were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. No participants had 
abnormally fast completion times (less than half the median) or incorrectly 
answered a question intended to screen inattentive participants. The median 
age was forty-one. Sixty percent of participants had college degrees. 
Participants were told that they would be asked to rate the conduct of a 
salesperson in various cases and that they should decide whether the differences 
between the cases were important to their evaluations. The car and laptop 
scenarios were presented on separate pages, with accompanying questions, in 
counterbalanced order. The scenarios were not labeled. 
At the end of the study, participants were also asked whether they had 
worked in sales, had ever bought a laptop or computer after talking to a 
salesperson, or considered themselves to be very knowledgeable about cars or 
computers. 
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2. Fraud Study: Results 
The twelve fraud scenarios were divided into two groups (car versus laptop) 
of six cases each (the various sales tactics). The primary data analysis on the 
blameworthiness and punishment data took the form of a two by six repeated 
measures ANOVA. The type of good did not have an effect on either measure, 
so the more expensive good did not lead to perceptions that the sales tactics 
were more blameworthy or deserving of more punishment. There was, however, 
an interaction between sales tactic and type of good on the punishment 
measure. When the salesperson falsely claimed the product was new, there was 
elevated punishment in the car case relative to the computer case (see Table 
4).63 For the other sales tactics, there were not differences between the 
computer and car cases. Notably, falsely claiming that the product was new was 
the only sales tactic that an overwhelming majority of participants rated as 
criminal, perhaps explaining why it alone shows this distinction. Overshadowing 
this interaction, however, was an effect of sales tactic on both blameworthiness 
and punishment.64 Since these effects were highly consistent across both 
measures and goods, we discuss them together. 
 
  
 
 63.  F(5, 245) = 4.76, p < .001 
 64.  Blameworthiness F(5, 245) = 48.43, p < .001; punishment F(5, 245) = 57.21, p < .001. 
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Table 4: Ratings of Fraud Scenarios in Terms of Blameworthiness, 
Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the Sample Criminalizing the 
Activity. 
Type of 
Good  Blameworthiness Punishment 
Percent 
Criminalizing 
Computer 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is New 6.50a (1.07) 4.28a (1.50) 80%a 
 
Lying About a 
Problem w/ the Model 6.40a (1.05) 3.96a (1.77) 58%b 
 
Omitting a Problem w/ 
the Model 4.72cd (1.76) 2.82bc (1.76) 28%cd  
 
Selling a Product w/ 
Defective Part 5.46b (1.63) 3.20b (1.80) 42%bc 
 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is on Sale 4.80c (1.78) 2.38c (1.66) 22%d  
 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is Popular 4.20d (1.83) 1.92d (1.24)   8%e 
Car 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is New 6.74a (0.63) 5.02a (1.36) 88%a 
 
Lying About a 
Problem w/ the Model 6.30b (1.02) 3.84b (1.90) 58%b 
 
Omitting a Problem w/ 
the Model 4.58de (1.81) 2.66d (1.70) 28%cd  
 
Selling a Product w/ 
Defective Part 5.56c (1.58) 3.38c (1.95) 44%bc 
 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is on Sale 4.70d (1.88) 2.40d (1.54) 26%cd  
 
Falsely Claiming 
Product is Popular 3.98e (2.04) 1.92e (1.32)   6%e 
Note: Within each good type, scores for a given dependent variable that do not share 
subscripts are significantly different from each other. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Blameworthiness and punishment scores are on scales ranging from one to 
seven. 
 
The scenario judged to be the most worthy of criminalization (slightly less 
than ninety percent in the case of the car and eighty percent in the case of the 
laptop) involved a false claim that the particular item being sold was new and 
brand name. This finding is consistent with the notion that true fraud involves 
misrepresentations that fundamentally impact the nature of the bargain. 
There was a significant drop-off from the scenario judged most worthy of 
criminalization to the scenario judged next most worthy of criminalization: 
when the salesperson explicitly lied about a problem with the model. Fifty-eight 
percent of participants rated this as deserving of criminalization. We expected 
this number to be higher because this misrepresentation also affects the nature 
of the bargain. One possible explanation is that a general problem with the 
model, rather than a problem with the particular unit, is something that the 
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customer could have independently investigated and verified. Some participants 
may have been holding the victim partially responsible in this case. 
Less serious than the deliberate lie was selling a product with a known 
defective component (between forty-two and forty-four percent of participants 
criminalized). Again, this case is criminal fraud under law. But in this case, only 
a minority of respondents rated it as such. One explanation is that the parts in 
these cases (batteries for both products) were viewed as comparatively 
insignificant. Alternately, our subjects might have made an implicit assumption 
that such immediate failures would be covered by a warranty. 
Our subjects made a clear distinction between affirmative statements and 
omissions. When the salesperson affirmatively lied about a problem with the 
models, close to sixty percent said it should be treated as a crime. When the 
salesperson merely failed to mention the very same problem, less than thirty 
percent said it should be treated as a crime. 
The category rated least deserving of criminal sanctions included 
misrepresentations thought to consist of non-material “seller’s talk.” When the 
salesperson falsely claimed the product was “on sale,” only twenty percent of 
respondents said the statement should be treated as a crime. When the 
salesperson falsely claimed the product was “popular with business people in 
New York City,” less than ten percent of respondents said this should be 
treated as a crime. The difference between the two cases can likely be explained 
by the fact that the first statement at least involved a question of the product’s 
“price,” while the second was “puffing” in its purest form. To the extent that 
subjects distinguished between misrepresentations concerning material facts 
and misrepresentations concerning non-material facts, their judgment was 
consistent with current law. But our subjects did not reliably criminalize all 
material misrepresentations. In these cases, though, it is hard to say what 
unspoken assumptions may have guided subjects. 
The relatively high assessments of moral blameworthiness are of interest. 
Although subjects seemed reluctant to brand these potentially fraudulent 
activities as criminal, they did register their moral aversion. While these sales 
strategies may be viewed as “lawful,” they were clearly not entirely acceptable 
from subjects’ ethical points of view. 
We again assessed the role of individual difference factors in shaping 
criminal justice attitudes. In this case, we formed separate blameworthiness, 
punishment, and criminality composites for the car and computer scenarios. For 
both sets of scenarios, economic conservatism was the only significant predictor 
of views on criminality (βcomputer = -.55, p < .001; βcar = -.42, p < .01) and 
punishment (βcomputer = -.39, p < .01; βcar = -.39, p < .01). The more economically 
conservative a person was, the less likely he or she was to judge a given act as 
fraudulent and the less punishment imposed. Economic conservatism was 
measured on a seven-point scale. For each step on the scale, from liberal to 
conservative, a participant was 9.8% less likely to judge a computer scenario as 
a case of fraud and 7.5% less likely to judge a car scenario as a case of fraud. 
GREEN&KUGLER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2012  3:10 PM 
58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:33 
Those respondents who viewed themselves as more conservative may have 
taken a laissez faire attitude that markets are self-regulating and government 
regulation, whether criminal or civil, is disfavored. No other measure had an 
independent effect. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
White collar criminal offenses, such as bribery, gratuities, perjury, false 
statements, and fraud, reflect a kind of moral ambiguity that is lacking in the 
case of many more familiar street crimes. Whether a given actor will be 
punished as a criminal, or admired as a successful businessperson, politician, 
lobbyist, or witness will often depend on nuanced moral judgments and subtle 
distinctions in facts. Because the ability of laypersons to distinguish between 
criminality and non-criminality and to make confident judgments about 
retributive desert is crucial to the functioning of the criminal justice system, we 
conducted a set of studies to assess lay attitudes regarding a variety of issues in 
white collar crime. 
In general, laypersons in our studies were capable of making fairly fine-
grained distinctions regarding white collar crime. In some cases, the distinctions 
made by our respondents were consistent with current law, and therefore lend 
weight to the view that the law draws distinctions in the appropriate places. For 
example, participants in the fraud study were mostly sensitive to the kind of 
distinctions that lie at the heart of fraud law, including the distinction between 
misrepresentations relating to the quality, adequacy, or price of goods or 
services, on the one hand, and mere “puffing,” on the other. The study, thereby, 
produced a pattern of results largely consistent with prevailing doctrines. 
In other cases, however, we found that the judgments made by our subjects 
differed in some significant ways from current law. In the domain of perjury, for 
example, public perceptions of seriousness diverged from current law, 
particularly with respect to the distinction between lying in court under oath 
and lying to police while not under oath. The familiar distinction between lying 
and merely misleading was also less sharp than under current law. Similarly, in 
the case of bribery, participants’ views diverged significantly from current 
American federal law. Participants wanted to criminalize both commercial 
bribery and payments accepted in return for performing a non-official act, 
neither of which would normally be criminalized under the status quo. In these 
latter cases where public attitudes diverged from current law, further 
investigation is in order. 
The moral intuitions of the lay public are an increasingly important 
component in criminal law theory. In the context of white collar crime, a part of 
criminal law that remains largely under-theorized and misunderstood, there is 
an even greater need for this kind of research. These data present some 
significant, if preliminary, insights into how the lay public would draw the 
boundaries between criminal and non-criminal white collar behavior. These and 
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future studies should serve to aid theorists and policymakers seeking to sensibly 
and coherently define the borders of legitimate business practice. 
 
